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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from the trial court's order denying 
Defendant's motion to suppress evidence and a finding of guilty 
as charged after a bench trial in Third Judicial Circuit. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. 
78-2a-3(2)(d) (1989) and Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
26(2)(a), Utah Code Ann. 77-35-26(2)(a) (1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the citing officer have probable cause for stopping the 
Defendant's vehicle? 
2. Was the Defendant's right to due process violated when the 
Prosecution denied discovery generally? 
3. Is Utah's Motor Vehicle Code Constitutional? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with failure to have a Utah driver's 
license and failure to have a Utah vehicle registration. After a 
bench trial. Defendant was found guilty as charged. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks an order from this Court suppressing 
certain evidence, and reversing of the judgment against her for 
having no Utah registration and no Utah driver license. 
Appellant also seeks a restraining order, that said vehicle and 
Appellant may travel upon the roadways of Utah unimpeded so long 
as Appellant is traveling in a safe and prudent manner. 
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IN UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
V. 
EILEEN 0. BOOTH 
Defendant/Appellant 
1 Case No. 890524-CA 
1 Category No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On June 30, 1989, Appellant was traveling in a safe and 
prudent manner, when Appellants' vehicle was stopped by 3 men in 
street clothes in a new red Ford Taurus sedan, who had been 
waiting to catch her, A citation was issued for no Utah 
registration and no Utah driver's license. The van was then 
impounded. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellant urges this Court to reverse the conviction for 
several reasons. The citing officer had no probable cause for 
stopping Appellant's vehicle in the first place. The prosecution 
denied Appellant's written general request for Discovery, citing 
State v. Knight as the reason. The sole purpose for Law 
enforcement officers seeking out every little infraction of the 
Motor Vehicle Code they can find seems to be harassment of the 
general populous as a revenue enhancement scheme. When our 
Constitution was instituted, the role of policemen was to go 
after criminals, people who committed crimes, leaving the general 
- 1 -
populous alone to pursue their private lives. The state of 
affairs in our once great Country has deteriorated into the same 
old tyranny our Founding Fathers severed with England in the War 
for Independence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT MAINTAINS CONTENTION THERE WAS NO 
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR STOPPING THE APPELLANT'S 
VEHICLE. 
Appellant was driving in a safe and prudent manner, when 
three men in street clothes and an unmarked car stopped the 
Appellant's vehicle. Appellant caused no accident, violated no 
traffic rules. Citing Officer had no "specific and articulable 
facts" Appellant had committed or was committing a crime. United 
States v. Armstrong. 722 F.2d. 681,684 (11th Cir. 1984). 
Officer Manning stated the "other investigator" told him the 
driver had no drivers license. This was an assumption, not a 
currently known fact. Did either officer make a call to the DMV 
to ascertain the fact the driver had no drivers license? 
The prosecutor states, in Brief of Respondent, p.7, 
"Defendant has the Constitutional right to travel, but ... not 
the constitutional right to operate a vehicle on Utah roads and 
highways outside the bounds of Utah law." Does that mean no one 
from outside of the State of Utah can operate a vehicle on Utah 
roads and highways? There are hundreds of such vehicles in Utah. 
The State invites and depends on tourism. Do they operate 
lawfully? If so, then isn't stopping the Defendant/Appellant 
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selective harassment? If they don't operate lawfully, are they 
all being stopped, cited and prosecuted? 
As a point of fact, it is unconstitutional to impound 
someone's vehicle at the time of citation- "No person shall be 
.•.deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law."U.S. Constitution, art. 5. 
POINT II 
THE STATE'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE A FULL DISCOVERY 
VIOLATED THE APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS 
AND THE ABILITY TO PREPARE A PROPER DEFENSE. 
The State claims it did not have to provide full discovery, 
according to State v Knight, which was overturned for lack of 
full discovery. State v Knight. 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987). 
Therefore, the Defendant/Appellant had no way of knowing 
what, if any, information was withheld or whether there was 
favorable information withheld that would result in prejudice and 
thereby warrant a reversal. That is only an assumption on the 
part of the prosecutor. 
POINT III 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF UTAH CODE 
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are 
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty 
and the pursuit of Happiness, That to secure these rights, 
governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers 
from the consent of the governed..." Declaration of Independence, 
1776. 
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That Creator, the Heavenly Judge of the Universe, before whom all 
will one day stand, is LAW-GIVER (James 4:12), Life-Giver, 
Sustainer of all, including the unseen world. Creator of 
all natural, physical and spiritual Laws, including the Common 
Law, These laws can never be broken, like the law of gravity, 
without suffering the consequences. All people are born with 
RIGHTS - to Life, Liberty and Property, with no hookups - and are 
respQngjfrig befpre god. 
The history of man down through the ages has been one of 
governments oppressing and enslaving the people - controlling 
life and depriving people of liberty and property. God told 
Israel what would happen when they wanted a human king. I Samuel 
8. He would take your land, your servants, your children and 
yourself into the service of the king. Look at Russia. Isn't this 
what is happening in the world and Utah, today? 
To escape tyranny and persecution in Europe, God's people 
immigrated to America, where they could have liberty and own 
property. Being greedy, the King couldn't stand seeing the 
colonies prosper without enriching himself. When his tyrannical 
and confiscatory taxes and laws became unbearable, the Colonies 
threw off the yoke of tyranny by the War for Independence. 
The Founding Fathers, well-schooled in history, law, human 
nature and the Bible, designed a government to PROTECT Liberty 
and Property. They knew the evil nature of man and political 
power: Greed in the hands of the few who lay burdens on the backs 
of the many. They set up a Republican form of government, where 
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there was one vote per family of property owners. The father was 
responsible for the family, including the schooling and 
discipline of the children. Today, Government keeps finding more 
and more ways to separate families, the foundation of society, 
and usurp their responsibilities. The Government today destroys 
families, destroys prosperity, destroys incentive and destroys 
jobs. That's why all the homeless. 
In this new government, of. the people, fex the people, and 
for the people, the people were sovereign over Government, with a 
Constitution which is the supreme Law of the Land. We, the 
People are sovereign, the MASTERS; and public officials and 
workers are SERVANTS. 
Purpose of the Constitution was to CHAIN DOWN GOVERNMENT! 
Form a limited Government whose main role was to PROTECT people 
and their RIGHTS. Punish evil, not promote it. 
We sometimes forget that our RIGHTS come from God and that 
the Common Law came about through much trial and tribulation. 
These lofty principles worked their way, through the Magna Carta, 
over to the Colonies and were incorporated after great struggle 
into the Bill of Rights. Those who framed our Constitution and 
the Bill of Rights were ever aware of the subtle encroachments on 
individual liberty. They knew that 
xillegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first 
footing... by silent approaches and slight deviations from 
legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by 
adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the 
security of person and property should be liberally 
construed.' Miranda v Arizona,384. 458-459. (Quoting Boyd v 
United States. 116. U.S. 616, 635) 
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We must not depart from this noble heritage. 
However, cunning men, by secrecy, deceit, and stealth, have 
gradually, through unscrupulous practices and unconstitutional 
legislation, changed our Republic into a "democracy", actually a 
socialistic tyrannical Government. Democracy is majority rule, 
totally opposed to Common Law principles. Today, we own nothing 
but the privilege of paying for every one else's something. You 
don't own your car, marriage, kids or house. Taxpayers' dollars 
support communism around the world. And enrich the few at the 
expense of the many. 
How is the United States any different from communist 
countries? They know they are in slavery. We are a conquered 
nation, but don't know it. We can't go anywhere unless our 
"papers" are in order.The Elitists, those who are deliberately 
destroying everything that made America great, are bent on 
"merging the United States comfortably with Russia" in order to 
|?uC UL? UM&t 3 8m-$e?ld diGt-dttorshipr Panama Canal give-away, 
genocide treaty, foreign aid, detente, grain deals, patent office 
give-away, sanctions against South Africa, etc. are all designed 
to give "aid and comfort" to the enemy. That is TREASON ! It 
was American dollars that built Russia up to be an adversary. 
All governments, including our own, have become tools in the 
hands of these One-Worlders, usurping the individual's rights and 
responsibility for himself before God. If America, and every-
thing it once stood for, is destroyed, the whole world loses. 
What about Utah? Is it Heaven or hell? What kind of hell? 
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People came to Utah to be tree and escape persecution» People 
like John Singer. Utah kills her heroes. Utah could have been 
the glory of the Union. They had their own gold and silver and 
militia. Utah can have whatever she wants. Just DEMAND it. 
As the nation goes, so goes Utah with its projects like 
vitro tailings, Antelope Island, UTA, pumps for Great Salt Lake, 
6th off ramp, Salt Aire, and now, the Winter Olympics and lite 
rail. Every project is an opportunity for politicians to enrich 
themselves by skimming or scamming. Follow the dollar. Why is a 
company allowed to make a profit, while the taxpayers pay for the 
clean up afterwards? People have left by thousands and there 
have been bankruptcies by thousands, till there is hardly any tax 
base left. Greedy politicians' desires have become more important 
than the needs of the people. What the people need is RIGHT 
EDUCATION, not regulation; INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY, not 
government control. Use a voucher system for transportation and 
schooling and encourage home schools, get rid of bloated, 
parasitic bureaucracy. Let people be in control of their own 
lives. It is not government's prerogative. People need to be 
taught the DIFFERENCE between different systems of government and 
the implications of each. That liberty is superior to any other 
system, including democracy. America was ordained to be a LIGHT 
to the world and to teach the way to liberty and prosperity for 
all. 
Are they killing all the babies, so there won't be another 
Stalin, Mussolini or a Mao? 
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Did you know that law enforcement officers bring in more 
revenue than the oil industry? [When do you call a cop? Never. 
Call a sheriff.] 
What do the people have to do to get an initiative on the 
ballot? They are inconvenienced to go to all the time and effort 
to get signatures, then the "powers that be' scare the people 
into thinking they will lose their jobs, that there will not be 
monies for education, etc. LIES ! LIES ! LIES ! So the people, 
in ignorance, vote against their best interests. How come there 
is no RECALL LAW? The predominate church could, but does not, 
inform people of their rights or how to demand honest Government. 
Every time Congress or the State legislatures meet, they 
pass thousands of new "laws", whose purpose is for revenue and 
CONTROL. More money in politicians' pockets. Under the guise of 
"public policy" or for the "public good", endless rules and 
regulations promulgate CONTROL of every aspect of our lives and 
of society. TYRANNY !!! SLAVERY !!! These "laws" deprive We, the 
People of our liberty and property, which is our God-given 
heritage and individual RESPONSIBILITY. You are familiar with the 
adage, "The power to tax is the power to control." And the power 
to DESTROY. The government is supposed to punish evil, not 
promote it. Romans 13. 
Since when do our public servants have the right to abolish 
Common Law crimes and make it a "crime" to violate any part of 
the Utah Code? (Utah Code annotated, 1973, 76-1-105.) Were the 
people made aware of this change, or given a chance to VOTE on 
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it? It is a known fact that Utah legislators laugh at the people 
and do what they themselves want, without giving the people a 
choice, except for how to pay for some new, expensive, unneeded, 
unaffordable project, TYRANNY !!! 
You took an oath to uphold the Constitution of Utah and the 
Constitution of the United States of America, called the supreme 
Law of the Land, That means no congressional or legislative act, 
which is contrary to the spirit and intent of the Constitution, 
is law. The Utah Code violates the letter and the spirit of both 
Constitutions, Driver's licenses and vehicle registrations are 
revenue and control schemes. Regulate traffic,yes, but not the 
driver, 
"Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove 
from one place to another according to inclination, is an 
attribute of personal liberty, and the right.,,of free 
transit,.. of any State is a right secured by the .,. 
Constitution," William? v Fear?, 179 q.g. 27Q,274, 
"Automotive vehicles are lawful means of conveyance. ,,.Many 
cases have been decided respecting the validity and con-
struction of statutes and ordinances regulating their use 
upon public highways,.,may regulate their speed and provide 
other reasonable rules and restrictions,,,. The city has 
.,.never had the power to prohibit the operation of auto-
motive vehicles on the city streets. Even the Legislature 
has no power to deny to a citizen the right to travel upon 
the highway,,.though this right may be regulated," Chicago 
Motor Coach Co, v city of Chicago,169 NE 22,25. 
"The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways 
and to transport his property ,,. is a common right which he 
has under his right to enjoy life and liberty,,. It is not a 
mere privilege.., which a city may permit or prohibit at 
will...but it may not arbitrarily or unreasonably prohibit 
or restrict it.,," Thompson v Smith, 154 SE 549, 583, 
"The right to travel is a part of the vliberty' of which the 
citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law,., 
Freedom of movement ...was a part of our heritage.,,. 
Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values,,.,Our 
nation has thrived on the principle that, outside areas of 
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plainly harmful conduct, every American is left to shape his 
own life as he thinks best,,,go where he pleases," Kent v 
Dulles. 357 U.S. 116, 125.126. 
"The right to travel is a well-established right that does 
not owe its existence to the Federal Government. It is 
recognized by the courts as a natural right. Any restraint 
imposed by the Government... must conform with the.. Fifth 
Amendment that *No person shall be... deprived of...liberty 
...without due process of law.1" Schachtman v Dulles. 225 
F.2d 938,941. 
Each State legislature is permitted, within the limits of the 
fundamental principles of liberty and justice, to make its own 
set of regulations. 
"But ... these legislative powers are not absolute and 
despotic [maybe not in 1883, but they are certainly headed 
in that direction today]...It is not every act, legislative 
in form, that is law. Law is something more than mere will 
exerted as an act of power. Arbitrary power, enforcing its 
edicts to the injury of the persons and property of its 
citizens, is not law. The enforcement of these limitations 
by judicial process protects the rights of individuals and 
minorities, as well against the power of numbers, and 
aqainst the violence of public agents transcending the 
limits of lawful authority, even when acting in the name and 
wielding the force of the government. Hurtado v California, 
110 U,ST 516, 532* 
"The right of a citizen to travel upon the highway and 
transport his property... differs radically and obviously 
from that of one who makes the highway his place of business 
and uses it for private gain.... The former is the ordinary, 
common right of a citizen; the latter is special, unusual 
and extraordinary.... to the latter [the legislative] power 
is broader..."State v.Citvof Spokane, 186 P 864, 865; Ex 
Parte Dickev, 8b SE 781, 783; Teche Lines v Danforth. TY 
gQ«2ql 734, 
"The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot 
thus be converted into a crime. Miller v United States, 230 
F 496, 490. 
"The assertion of federal rights, when plainly and 
reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name of 
local practice. Davis v Wechsler, 263, U.S. 22,24. 
"If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, 
threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise of 
enjoyment of any right... secured to him by the Constitution 
... or go in disguise on the highway... whoever, xunder 
color of any law' willfully subjects any inhabitant of any 
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State to the deprivation o£ any rights.,.shall be punished 
... Section 19 and 20 of the Criminal Code (U.S.C., Title 18, 
sec. 51.) United States v Classic. 313 U.S. 299. 
It's the duty of the Courts to declare statutes unconstitutional 
that violate the spirit and intent of the Constitution and the 
Bill of Rights. "He who will rule or judge, should do so in the 
fear of God." Proverbs 3:7, 29:2,12. One day you will stand 
before the Heavenly Bar of Justice. How will you plead? Remember, 
ignorance of the Law is no excuse. 
Congress declared 1983 the Year of the Bible and the Bible 
the Word of God (See Addendum). This makes God's Laws the supreme 
Law of the Land. Man's "laws" are awful, not Lawful. Man's laws 
DESTROY rights, CONFISCATE property and OPPRESS the people. 
Government was meant to administer God's Law. God's Laws PROTECT 
RIGHTS and PROPERTY, our heritage, PROMOTE LIBERTY. God educates. 
Americans once more need to stand up and DEMAND to renew the 
Declaration of Independence. For our Government "has obstructed 
the Administration of Justice... erected a multitude of new 
offices, and sent hither swarms of Officer to harass our people, 
and eat out their substance... combined with others to subject us 
to a jurisdiction foreign to our Constitution, and unacknowledged 
by our laws...for imposing Taxes on us without our Consent... 
abdicated [our Republican form of] government..." is destroying 
everything our Founding Fathers fought and died for. DECLARATION 
QF INDEPENDENCE. 
What does all this have to do with the constitutionality of 
the Utah Code? Everything. If I have a horse and call his tail 
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a leg, how many legs does the horse have? Just because I call 
the tail a leg, does not make it so. So too, with the Utah Code. 
Just because the Courts have declared it Constitutional, DOES NOT 
MAKE IT SO ! The Utah Code violates the letter and the spirit of 
the United States Constitution and God's Law: The philosophy of 
limited government and individual responsibility. The 
Constitution has prescribed the rights of the individual when 
confronted with the power of Government, Miranda v Arizona. 479. 
Rights cannot be abridged. 
"Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government 
officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct 
that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, 
existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails 
to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the 
potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it 
teaches the whole people by its example* Crime is 
contagious. If the Government becomes a law breaker, it 
breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a 
law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in 
the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the 
means... would bring terrible retribution. Against that 
pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its 
face.» Olmstead v United States. 227 U.S. 438. 485 (1928). 
Along these same lines, it has been pointed out: The quality of a 
nation's civilization can be largely measured by the methods it 
uses in the enforcement of its criminal law. 
You can have all the regulations you want. I don't come 
under them. I claim all my RIGHTS under the Federal and State 
Constitutions. "Where rights secured by the Constitution are 
involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would 
abrogate them." Miranda v Arizona, 491. I live by the 
Constitution and the admonition, "Do unto others, as you would 
they would do unto you." Matthew 7:12. 
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We have come to the place, just as God said, evil is called 
good, and good evil. Isaiah 5:20. "It is the duty of court to be 
watchful for the Constitutional rights of the citizen, and 
against any stealthy encroachments thereon." Boyd v United 
States, 635. 
Americans need to DEMAND that all public servants OBEY the 
Law they swore to uphold. They also need to refuse State granted 
"privileges" and claim their God-given inalienable RIGHTS. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument, I respectfully request the 
decision of the lower Court be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this &• « day of March, 1990 
Eileen Booth 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Filed seven (7) copies of the within Reply Brief of the 
Appellant with the Utah Court of Appeals, and served 2 copies on 
Plaintiff/Respondent by delivering said copies to DAVID E. Y0C0M, 
Salt Lake County Attorney and DAVID S. WALSH, Deputy Salt Lake 
County Attorney at 2001 South State Street, #S3700, Salt Lake 
city, Utah 844190-1200. 
Dated this ,3 7 ^ daV o f Mar^h, 1990. 
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ADDENDUM 
CONGRESS DECLARES BIBLE 
"THE WORD OF GOD" 
PUBLIC LAW 97-280—OCT. 4, 1982 
Public Law 97-280 96 STAT. 1211 
97th Congress 
Joint Resolution 
Authorizing and requesting the President to proclaim 1983 as the "Year of the Bible". 
Whereas the Bible, the Word of God, has made a unique contribu-
tion in shaping the United States as a distinctive and blessed 4y* 
nation and people; | | | 
Whereas deeply held religious convictions springing from the Holy •** 
Scriptures led to the early settlement of our Nation; 
Whereas Biblical teachings inspired concepts of civil government 
that are contained in our Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution of the United States; 
Whereas many of our great national leaders—among them Presi- w 
dents Washington, Jackson, Lincoln, and Wilson—paid tribute to | | ] 
the surpassing influence of the Bible in our country's develop- w 
ment, as in the words of President Jackson that the Bible is "the 
rock on which our Republic rests"; 
Whereas the history of our Nation clearly illustrates the value of 
voluntarily applying the teachings of the Scriptures in the lives of 
individuals, families, and societies; W 
Whereas this Nation now faces great challenges that will test this III 
Nation as it has never been tested before; and i*l 
Whereas that renewing our knowledge of and faith in God through | | j 
Holy Scripture can strengthen us as a nation and a people: Now, tU 
therefore, be it 
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That the President is 
authorized and requested to designate 1983 as a national "Year of 
the Bible" in recognition of both the formative influence the Bible tyf 
has been for our Nation, and our national need to study and apply In 
the teachings of the Holy Scriptures. 
1 1 1 
1 
III 
I I 
i 
i 
Approved October 4, 1982. M 
If ^ 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY AN ACT OF CONGRESS 
HAS DECLARED THAT THE BIBLE 
IS "THE WORD OF GOD" AND "HOLY SCRIPTURE" 
The United States Congress has settled it. The Bible is now officially proclaimed by a Law of the United States to 
be "the Word of God." 
Public Law 97-280 (see other side) is not just a statement by Congress. It is a Law, an official Act of the elected 
Representatives of the People of the United States sitting in Law-making session. That the Holy Bible is "the Word 
of God" is now "the Law of the Land." 
In addition Public Law 97-280 states "that renewing our knowledge of and faith in God through Holy Scripture 
can strengthen us as a nation and a people," and it rules that the United States has a "national need to study and 
apply the teachings of the Holy Scripture." 
As surely as it was the intent of the first U.S. Congress that the Government not interfere with the Christian 
religion, just as surely as it has now been declared the intent of the 1982 United States Congress that the Bible is 
"the Word of God" and that the People of the United States should use "the Holy Scriptures" to renew their "faith 
in God." 
Under Public Law 97-280 a study of "the Holy Scripture" should now be made a part of every public and private 
school cirriculum. The Law does not say it is the "right" of people to study the Bible, the Law says, "our knowledge 
of and faith in God through Holy Scriptures can strengthen us as a nation and a people." Anyone attempting in any 
way to prevent any American citizen from acquiring that' 'knowledge of and faith in God through the Holy Scripture'' 
is attempting to weaken America. For instance, individuals and organizations who advocate the banning of the Bible 
from the public schools or who actively oppose any Bible study group or interfere in any way with a Christian Church 
would be guilty of violating this Law and probably guilty of sedition against the United States of America. 
The American People are a law-abiding People. Every American who believes what Public Law 97-280 says 
should not only obey this Law, but should actively work to inform other Americans about this Law to the end that it 
will become widely observed throughout the United States and its territories. This would not only be pleasing to 
Almighty God, but, according to the U.S. Congress, would benefit our People exceedingly. 
Disobedience of this Law should be discouraged in our own communities and in the nation at large. Copies of 
Public Law 97-280 should be given to friends, neighbors and especially to public servants who can then take whatever 
action is necessary in their own departments or under their own realm of authority to comform to Public Law 97-280. 
All Elementary, and High School Principals, Superintendents and College Presidents shoud be given copies and 
urged to take immediate steps to add courses of Bible study to their school curriculum to bring them into conformity 
with the intent of Congress. 
With the wide dissemination of copies of Public Law 97-280 all America will come to know that the marvellous 
Truth that the Holy Bible is "the Word of God" has now been made "the Law of the Land." They will see that in that 
Law the People's Representatives have recognized the "need" for all Americans to "study and apply the teachings 
of the Holy Scripture." 
The study of the Holy Scriptures leads to Jesus Christ. Jesus said of the Scripture, "They are they which testify 
of Me." (John 5:39b.) Therefore, this will be is another significant step by our Nation and our People toward that day 
when "every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father." This is a marvellous 
thing and is quite obviously the Hand of God ruling and overruling in the affairs of our Nation. Praise Jesus I 
Pray that God will bless America in this, through Jesus Christ, 
Pastor Sheldon Emry 
Copies of this sheet with Public Law 97-280 on the other side are available from Lord's Covenant Church or America's 
Promise, PO Box 5334, Phoenix, Arizona 85010. Up to 100 copies will be sent free to one address. Our printing cost 
is about 3 cents a copy and for larger orders we would appreciate an offering to pay the printing and postage costs. 
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RETROSPECTIVE IMPAIRMENT OF 
air Foster 
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.
knse statutes; are 
way, or to any ex-
>ective, or ex post 
ir operation or ef-
in any view, impair, 
: limit solidly deter-
lts? If so; how, or in 
nd to what extent? 
i there any solidly 
)le rights involved 
1 be impaired dr 
le answer to this is a 
definite YES! The 
jadways exist as a 
owing from thou-
haps millions of in-
ivate grants of rights 
le grantor's realty in 
!a for roadway pur-
effectuate passage, 
transport free of en-
*, toll or charge, etc. 
arious private gran-
or allowed, or sold 
to use the way across 
id in perpetuity to the 
large. The public at 
compasses and in-
y and all natural per-
il individual grant of 
sty is considered in the 
rontract by which the 
lse the way as granted 
ryed to the public. Do 
id in the legal capacity 
1 person, or, perhaps, 
tizen, have the right to 
g those ways? Unques-
resi 
lie rights as granted 
nd include motor 
as a mode of travel? 
mverse of this proposi-
uld be that a motor 
s an unlawful vehicle 
ted upon the public's 
ut not when used only 
te property. There are 
$es holding that a motor 
is not an unlawful 
nor inherently dan-
when used upon the 
t is a principle and alike 
i of law that a grant of 
r powers necessarily in-
everything required to 
•- *u*» tmnt From this it 
RIGHTS 
follows that any form of vehicle 
which is reasonably suitable' 
and used as a mode of travel is 
properly included within the 
grant. 
"Where property is dedicated 
for use as a street or highway, the 
use thereof is not limited to the 
means of travel in use at the time 
of the dedication, but includes the 
right to use improved methods of 
travel." (From CIS, Dedication, 
66,p.562) 
"Wlxere the owner of land dedi-
cated it to the public for a road, he 
impliedly grants the attendant or 
incidental right to make such use 
of it as shall suitably fit for travel" 
Anderson v. Stuarts Draft 
Water Co., 197 Va. 36, 87 
S.E.2d 756 
"The primary purpose for which 
highways and streets are estab-
lished and maintained is the con-
venience of public travel" 
State ex rel. York v. Board 
of Com'rs. of Walla Walla 
County, 28 Wash.2d 891, 
184 p.2d 577, 172 ALR 1001 
"The purpose of dedicating 
streets and highways for public use 
is to permit travel thereover, and 
means by which travel is effected 
is secondary to primary purpose 
and may change from time to time 
with new inventions and changed 
conditions" 
Chicago & Milwaukee Elect. 
Ry. Co. v. Public Service 
Comm. of Wise, 254 Wis. 
551, 37 N.W.2d 42 
"The public was not limited to 
using a strip of land, dedicated as 
a street, by pedestrians and horse-
back riders, as at the time of 
dedication, but the character of 
permissible use changed with the 
times and modes of travel, so as to 
authorize the use of the strip by 
automobiles." 
City of Hazard v. Eversole, 
313 Ky. 254, 230 S.W.2d 921 
If the use of motor vehicles 
was held as not within the 
grants of dedication, but all 
pedestrian and animal-drawn 
vehicles were valid; then the 
legislature would have no 
power to permit, via license, the 
use of motor vehicles upon the 
public roads. To do so would be 
to breach the conditions of the 
grants unlawfully. The grants of 
dedication are contracts ex-
ecuted, and the legislature 
would violate and impair the 
contracts by allowing the doing 
of a thing not within the grants. 
In order to accomplish a 
licensing requirement the legis-
lature must prohibit the doing 
of an act, or the use of a thing. 
The word "prohibit" is pointed-
ly stressed; it is the prohibition 
which is a key element of this 
article. 
In regard to the motor 
vehicle license, what is it EX-
ACTLY that the legislature has 
prohibited, but then allows 
only under license and sub-
sequent to the payment of the 
tax? 
Beware the next few ques-
tions -- they are asked, in a very 
specific arid somewhat rhetori-
cal way as a means to explore 
this area in depth. 
1) Has the use of motor 
vehicles been prohibited? NO! 
Had such actually been done 
the use of them for any purpose, 
even on private property, 
would be illegal. Such a posi-
tion would be tantamount and 
perilously close to an outright 
prohibition of the mere owning 
or keeping of such machines as 
property. The use of a thing, or 
the utility of a thing; its use, is a 
basic definition of property. 
2) Has the use of the roads 
been prohibited? Obviously 
not. If such had been done 
everyone would be required to 
get a license just to walk along 
the roads as a pedestrian. Fur-
ther, such would be a total 
abrogation of all of the rights of 
use of the ways as granted, in-
cluding those of the property 
owner also. 
3) Has the use of any or all 
vehicles been prohibited? NO! 
For much the same explanation 
as at number 1 above. 
4) Has the use of any or all 
vehicles upon the roads been 
prohibited? NO! Today, the use 
bf animal-drawtl vehicles is not 
a subject of required license. In 
some states, the Amish and 
Mennonite, etc., religious 
societies, whose views do not 
allow the use of mechanically 
powered travel, can "register" 
their buggies, etc., but whether 
such "registration" necessarily 
includes the payment of a 
"license tax" is not known to this 
writer. It is believed that such 
"registration" is optional and 
voluntary. 
It is true that the taxing and 
licensing Of animal-drawn 
vehicles was pursued soon after 
the establishment of this nation 
(see Hylton V.U.W., 3 Dall. 171, 
1 LEd. 169, upon a congres-
sional statute of 1794), and 
then, beginning in the mid-
1800's, was soon almost a 
universal activity by many larger 
municipal corporations (see 
Bennett V. Birmingham [1854] 
31 Pa. St. 16), and justified 
mosdy upon the basis of paying 
for the pavement of the city 
streets. 
With the advent of motor 
vehicles, municipal corpora-
tions were allowed to license 
and tax motor vehicles similarly 
as animal-drawn vehicles, most-
ly enabled by charter changes, 
or enabling statutes supplemen-
tal to the city charter. The thrust 
of the justification for the licens-
ing requirement changed slight-
ly from primarily taxation as a 
source of revenue for paving 
and maintenance, to include an 
increasing element of regula-
tion, as under the police power, 
of the rapidly increasing num-
ber of motor vehicles. The trend 
of licensing of animal-drawn 
vehicles declined to virtual non-
existence. 
Starting about 1916, concur-
rent with the first federal aid to 
the highways as promoted 
under the congressional 
authority "to establish post 
roads/ the thrust of the licens-
ing of motor vehicles shifted 
from the municipalities to the 
state. Soon state-wide licensing 
preempted the field and the 
cities were left mosdy to the 
lesser end of local taxation only, 
and usually by enabling statute. 
Your city "license" "sticker" you 
are "required" to buy each year 
is the residuum of the lineage of 
vehicle "license taxation" dis-
cussed above. 
5) Has the use of motor 
vehicles upon the roads been 
prohibited? NO! Surprised? 
There are some private roads, 
including private parking lots. 
The vehicle licensing statues 
properly do not extend to tax or 
regulate motor vehicles upon 
such privately owned premises. 
[Had any parking lot tickets 
ately?) 
6) Has the use of motor 
vehicles upon the public's 
oads been prohibited? Well, 
low, we're starting to get to the 
lub of the matter. Perhaps such 
5 true, but then, perhaps such 
> not EXACTLY true. That the 
ubject matter of the prohibi-
on has something to do with 
lotor vehicles is conceded and 
tipulated. Further, that the 
abject matter has something to 
o with a particular USE of the 
ublic's roads also is conceded 
id stipulated. But what, EX-
CTLY, is the type of USE which 
is been prohibited? 
The reason for pursuing the 
)ove rhetorical type of ques-
ms was to "cover the field" as 
* progress toward the final 
>int; the "coverage" is founda-
>nal. We have arrived at a 
icture ^ here we must deter-
ne what the particular USE is 
it has been prohibited. A 
dew of the above will show 
it it is NOT the use of motor 
licles, and it is NOT the use 
the public's roads, each per 
which has been prohibited! 
her it is something else, and 
t something else has to do 
h a particular use only. 
USE FOR TRAVEL 
(F it were to be held that all 
tor vehicles which are upon, 
or run along a public road are, 
required to bejicensed, then, it 
would necessarily be that the 
jSgjsiatyre has prohi^itedgu) 
uses of all motor vehicles upon 
the public's roads. (For an inter-
esting case negating the above, 
.ysee State V. Hall, Mo.App., 351 
7S.W.2d460) 
Does theJegjslature have the 
power to i^roWbit^Jises of all 
motor vehicles upon the 
public's roads? Itij^he position 
in this article tha(NO]Je^slature 
in the U.S. has sucEapoweiT* 
IF it is urged that a legislature 
does have such a power, and 
has in fact prohibited all uses of 
all motor vehicles^upon the 
public's roads, except under 
^Jicense^ then a motor vehicle 
would have been made an il-
legal device when used on a 
public road, but not an illegal 
device when used on private 
property. (This statement as 
made here is slightly different 
than the statement made earlier 
in the 3rd paragraph of part 1 in 
last month's ALERT.) 
Should it be urged or held 
that this is or was a pj^hibjjjgn 
of all uses of all motor vehicles 
upon the public's roads, then 
thejegiskuyre has, by statute 
rcqujrin^Jic£QS^ (a.k.a. 
registration) on the vehicle, 
IVESTED the common law 
t\Yo~ use a motor vehicle (ri| 
upon the public's roads as a 
mode of travel. A requirement 
thaj*3jl motor vehicles must be 
JUc^ense^ when upon the 
public^froads is a result neces-
sarily following from a statutory 
prohibition o^ay^usesotall 
motor vehicles upon the 
public's roads, and such a , 
* PXSJU^iSJl m u s t necessarily 
^
c5Jb^BIX^I the common 
jaw^jrighiSlrr^viblation of the 
provision against impairment of 
cbntracts at UJLJfora^ 
Art. 1, Sec. 10 Where thtffrghts^ 
of a contract are removeSTor 
reduced, the contract is im-
paired. The SOURCE of the 
foght)to use the public's roads 
for purposes of passage, t£gyel, 
and transport lies in the multi-
tudinous private contracts 
granting such (rights\ and the 
grants include tho(jrighrjo use a 
motor vehicle as a mode to ef-
fect the passage, or travel and 
transport. The(rights;became 
VESTED upon the acceptance 
and use by the public. 
Many state constitutions 
contain a provision against 
j w o s g e c t i ^ j a w s j Although 
the IJ.$. Constfo^inn does not 
in direct terms prohibit 
retrospective laws, neverthe-
less retrospective laws are to an 
extent prohibited at Art. 1, Sec. 
10, in regard ex post facto laws, 
and laws .impairing the obliga-
tion ofcontracSTsee 1914 Ed., 
ier^Uw^J2i£tiQnjary, at 
Retrospective). 
Any statute which actually re-
^Hl?£5vUSSC5fy o n a^ motor 
vehicles upon the public's 
roads, by having ggjhfoited^the 
use of motor vehicles for pur-
poses of travel is a^retrgsggo 
tivejaw^in that the statute has 
(see Black's Law Dictionary. 4th 
Ed., at Ex Post Facto Laws). In 
virtually all cases of dedication 
of rights-of-way, jthe contract 
granting such(rights) preceded 
the statute. Further, as to 
dedications subsequent to any 
statute prohibiting the use of 
motor vehidesiorpurposes of 
.travel, the dedicator, by the 
force of the statute, could not 
grant the use of the way for use 
by motor vehicles, and, there-
fore, all such subsequent grants 
conveyed only the use by 
pedestrian and animal-drawn 
vehicles. If this be considered 
as the case, then the state has 
no power to allow the use of 
such subsequently granted 
ways by automotive vehicles. 
Additionally, such a statute, 
by m^hibitjQg the use of motor 
veniciSlo^travel purposes, ef-
fectively compels all vehicle 
owners to dedicate their per-
sonal and private property to a 
business type purpose (but not 
necessarily a public, or quasi-
public business) without just 
compensation and without due 
process of law (see Frost & 
Frost Trucking V. RR Comm. of 
Calif, 271 US 583, 70 L.Ed. 
1101). Such a statutorycom-
p i^lsion is in contravenuSfTof 
theN'5tfi AmencJmem^Tthe" U. S. 
Constitution, and any equal 
provision in any State C 
tion. 
Moreover, any such 
by prohibiting motor veh 
a ^valuPai^ lawful m< 
private travel and transp< 
transportation), is an c 
facto law, in that thq£r 
such use existed and v 
pressly recognized juc 
before the enactment 
statute. Such subse 
statute not onlyjgmairej 
(Tight) but it a t s o t 
jjroKibited the exercise 
(righfoo use a motor vehi 
travel purpoges. To the 
that suchfrighft of autoi 
travel was proliibite^ an 
currently made pcti 
criminal (prij^arily^orja; 
}
 purposes), the statute is 
post facto law. What 
before the enactment, full 
fill and innocent and by( 
was made criminal and 
after the facTof^ie vesti 
such(rigffiin the public at 
BUTr this element of ex 
facto applies only to the a 
of motor vehicles used foi 
poses of travel and pr 
transport. 
DEDICATIONS, 
THE FEE IN THE SC 
& 
THE RIGHT OF PRO 
In the forgoing portioi 
this article it should have 
come clear that the dedics 
of the ways for roads gra 
the use of their private prot 
to the public for purpose 
passage, travel and transj 
The dedications, whei 
viewed individuallvpx^i 
whole, conveyed the(RIGH 
such use by means of pri 
contract, either express or 
plied, directly from the pri 
owner of the land to thejjen 
public. It is the (rights 
granted which create anc^c 
prise th^public^s l*state)ca 
the "Highways;" suchmghtSl 
th<estate in trustjthereof h 
incorporeal form of property 
dependent of the physi 
landed property; ajiyj^ gducj 
of thetri^^thereinj^npairs 
Pl&ggrty; any removal of 
^p^d^stroysjhe property 
duction of the 
^in^mpairs^ the 
r^removalofthe 
g^thepjop&tX. 
cators of the ways 
rant the remaining 
• fee in the soil, nor 
of the right of profit 
5£of the easement, 
jhtjbffree andunin-
Sassage was granted 
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ained from the fol-
tes: 
be owner of proper-
a common-law 
\, the ultimate fee 
naffected thereby, 
2 government, the 
Ity, por the public 
any interest other 
t of mere ease-
edicatlon, 50, p. 522 
cases from 28 
ttes cited.) 
>ry dedication. In 
dictions a dedica-
in accordance with 
; providing therefor, 
on-low dedication, 
further right in the 
zated than a mere 
30)" 
edicatlon, 50, p. 523 
of the word fee* in 
*claring that recor-
ylat shall vest fee of 
mded for public use 
or city in trust for 
d does not vest fee 
\te in city or county 
merely creates an 
Hook, Mo.App., 177 
S.W.2d 165 
"If the dedicator retains a 
fee title, he retains all rigbtsHn 
the property not necessary for 
the enjoyment of the easement 
bytbepublic.(73.60)" 
26 QS, Dedication, 53, p. 532 
"A property owner, on ex-
ecuting a deed conveying to 
state highway department an 
unqualified right of way for 
construction of state highway 
in front of bis residet\cq, was 
owner of the fee to tbel center of 
the highway* subject to public 
easement" 
Lcppard V. Central Carolina 
Tel. Co., 205 S.C. 1, 30 S.E.2d 
755 
"While the dedicator holds 
the technical legal fee for the 
donated use as long as that use 
continue^he retains bis ex-
clusiv^rigbtjin the soil for pur-
pose of user or profit not incon-
sistent with the public ease-
ment.(75)" 
QS, Dedication, 53, p. 532 
"The interest residing in the 
abutting owner is not a contin-
gent one, but a present subsist-
ing ownership of the fee, sub-
ject only to the easement in 
favor of the public." 
Mayor and Council of City of 
Baltimore V. U.S., CCA Md., 
147 F.2d 786 
'The state or municipality 
has, however, (no) right to 
ucbftr^ejbe use without award-
ifing compensation not only to 
the persons enjoying the use 
but to the owner of the fee on 
which the use is an ease-
ment. (94)" 
26 QS, Dedication, 53, p. 534 
"Tbe(^bts)of the public in 
dedicated property are usually 
determined in accordance 
with the terms of the dedica-
tion, and such use of dedicated 
land is authorized as is fairly 
within the terms of the dedica-
tion and reasonably serves to 
fit the land for enjoyment by 
the public in the manner con-
templated. (555)" 
26 QS, Dedication, 54, p. 536 
"A dedicator is presumed to 
have intended dedicated 
property to be used by public, 
within limits of dedication, in 
such way as will be most con-
venient and comfortable and 
according to not only proper-
ties and usages known at time 
of dedication, but also to those 
justified by lapse of time and 
change of conditions." 
Odell V. Pile, Mo., 260 S.W.2d 
521 
"Unless there are reserva-
tions, the general public, that 
is to say any and every one, has 
lbe(rigb^ to use dedicated 
property to the full extent to 
which such easements are com-
monly used;...(6)" (continued 
below) 
"Property which has been 
dedicated to a certain 
municipality is not restHcted 
to its use by residents of such 
municipality, but people of 
sfate generally have an equal 
(jityfiho enjoy it." 
Schlen V. City of Wrden, 5 
lll.2d 494, 126 N.E.2d 201 
[Continued from above] 
"...and the person making the 
dedication may not object to 
such use whether the public 
owns the fee or only a right-of-
way. However, no right exists 
to impose on the property dedi-
cated burdens in addition to 
those placed on the property by 
the dedicator himself" 
26 QS, Dedication, 54, p. 537 
"Aprivate easement is one in 
which the enjoyment is 
restricted to one or a few in-
dividuals, while ajmblic ease-
ment is one tbef^^io the en-
joyment of which is vested in 
the public generally or in an 
entire community; such as an 
easement of passage on the 
public streets and highways or 
of navigation on a stream." 
Kennelly V. Jersey City, 57 
NJ.Law 293, 30 A. 531, 26 
L.R.A. 281 
(From J j a g l ^ U w Diction? 
ary, 4th Ed., at Easement) 
From this string of quotes, 
the message should become 
abundantly clear that j ^ e 
owners or dedicators did$oT) 
grant any ^ gggj) to take grofil# 
from the use of the easements. 
Indeed, in some instances, 
where a statute indicated that 
the "fee" supposedly was to be 
conveyed, the courts haye 
HELD that the.fee does(NCyb 
pass, only a mere easement. 
Had it been the case that the 
courts ruled that the Jge did 
pass, then the use of the ease-
ments for purposes of profit 
would have been a{rigM on an 
equal basis as that of passage 
and travel! There is a very sub-
stantiaLilifFerence between al-
lowing a limited use for passage 
and without profit, in contrast 
to allowing the use for profit. A 
quote from a famous case gives 
the reason: 
"As according to the feudal law, 
the whole beneficial interest in the 
land consisted in the(n$fao take 
the rents and profits, me general 
rule has always been, in the lan-
guage of Coke, that 'if a man 
seized ofjmd in fee by his deed 
granteth to another the profits of 
thoseJands, to have and to hold to 
him and his heirs, that maketh 
livery secundum formam chartae, 
the whole land itself doth pass. For 
what is the land but the profits 
thereop* Co.Lit. 45. And that a 
devise of thejgpls and profits or 
the income of la/ids passes tlte 
land itself both at law and in equi-
ty. Harm. Wills (5th ed) 798, and 
cases cited.n 
Pollock V. Fanner's Loan & 
Trust Co., (1894), 157 US, at 
580, 39 L.Ed., at 819 
A dedicator intending to 
grant only ah easement of pas-
sage by a methodology as 
prescribed by statute could not 
be compelled by mere statute to 
part with the whole of his inter-
ests in his land. Even under the 
more pressing procedure of 
eminent domain many 
decisions have held that only a 
mere easement passes to the 
public; the residuaifnghtsfofthe 
Jeg remain with the owper of 
* 3 
the land. Of the fou£maior 
methods by^which the public 
acquiresdl^ gbt) of way, only an 
easement is obtained, and none 
allow aCrighi) of profit in the 
public. In a sense, it could be 
said that t£ose who Jake profit 
fropi the use of the ways commit 
a ^ e f f } u p o n the abutting 
owners. Nowhere in the several 
hundreds of reported cases 
studied by this writer concern-
ing Ucensing of vehicles and 
driversTuse of the roads, etc., 
has there been even an oblique 
reference to the idea that the 
taldr^of profit fron^ejise^of 
"3ie roads as being s^ieft^orjortj 
upon the abutting owners. Per-
haps the reason is explained in 
part thusly: 
"Operation of motorbusses on 
public streets for tmnsportationof 
passengers for Hit is public(nf^ 
at common law/ 
City of St^ Psm! V. Twin City 
Motor Bus Co., 187 Minn. 212, 
245 N.W. 33 
"At jcommon lawXright)to 
operate stage coaches for hire on 
public streets was public; and 
therefore express legislative 
prohibition was necessary to make 
taxicab operator's use of streets 
unlawful." 
City and County of Denver V. 
Thralikill, 125 Colo. 488, 244 
P.2d 1074 
These two "glibs" are from 
CJS, Motor Vehicles, 10, p. 173; 
che main text relating to the first 
•glib" says, "...the owner^of a 
motor vehicle has thqjigh|\o 
make a reasonable use ofsuch 
vehicle upon the streets and 
highways in the business of car-
rying passengers or freight for 
hiig,..." From this one can see 
that the subject is the use of a 
motor vehicle; that the com-
monJgw(||ght) relates to the 
vehicle, ortEe use of the roads. 
The aspect of the taking of profit 
is JQQJ discussed. The aspect 
that the use of a motor vehicle, 
even for a business purpose, 
supports the view that a motor 
rehicle is a lawful device; one 
pvhich is within thet^jpipat the 
common law -- and within the 
rightfuLuse of the roads as 
granted by the dedicators. 
The main text associated 
with the second "glib" says, "...a 
taxicab company has the<fjghb 
within a reasonable limit, to use 
a street in properly prosecuting 
{its calling, as long as such use 
does not obstruct others in 
legitimately using it on equal 
terms/ This confirms the 
a§p^ct that everyone has equal 
(right) to use the roads j(no)one 
can rightfuUvdaim a superior 
right of use,{$rcit^ tage coaches, 
and (no£ taxicabs, even under 
Ucense^ Again, the aspect of the 
taking of profit is pot discussed. 
Does a legislature have the 
power to allow thejaljmg^of 
profit from the u s e o t t h e 
dedicator's property? Obvious-
lyfncH?) There are constitutional 
PIPkM^Qns^a^inst thejtajcin^ 
of private property for public 
uses, and, in many states there 
is an additional express prohibi-
tion against theuWng^of Bjjyaie 
property for private purposes. 
Any statute allowing, as under 
license, the taking of profit from 
the use of the ways would fit 
squarely within the latter 
pjpjiibjjion, but not "necessari-
ly" within the former. 
TRADE & TRAFFIC 
ON THE HIGHWAYS 
When one reads and studies 
a larger number of case reports 
on the subject of vehicle licen-
ses and driver licenses, a par-
ticular refrain will be found to 
be stated in a sizable number of 
:the cases. Almost with 
regularity the Court will state 
that "no one has a right to use 
the roads (streets, highways, 
etc.) as a place of business," or 
"to obtain a profit from the use 
of the streets." Even in the 
various cases where these type 
of lines are not expressly stated, 
one can "read them into the 
case, between-the-lines," so to 
speak, by studying the fact situa-
tion closely. In nearly every 
case the facts will reveal that the 
defendant was engaged in and 
actually pursuing some kind of 
business or commercial activity 
upon the highways, and, of 
course, the intent to derive 
livelihood, or profit or gain is a 
firm presumption inferred 
directly from the fact of the 
business type activity. The in-
tent to obtain a pecuniary gain 
directly, or indirectly through 
barter, actually is the true core 
of all vehicle and driver license 
offenses, whether under statute 
or under ordinance. This is 
THE element required to satisfy 
mens rea, but almost never al-
leged in a complaint or informa-
tion in the "modern" traffic 
courts, and, naturally, never 
shown or proved either. 
Going back in time, let's look 
at an "old" case where the com-
plaint/information did allege a 
business/commercial use of the 
streets and did allege an intent 
to obtain gain, but did so by 
using a peculiar phraseology. 
The case is City of St. Louis v. 
Green et al (1879) 7 Mo.App. 
468. At page 469, the Court 
stated the fact situation thusly: 
"Defendants were charged, in 
the First District Police Court of 
the city of St. Louis, with violation 
of sec. 1 of City ordinance No. 
10494 of that city, approved 
January 7,1878, in this: that, being 
owners and drivers of a certain 
two-horse wagon, they did, on a 
day named, drive and cause to be 
driven said vehicle from place to 
place on Pine Street and on Twen-
tieth Street, public streets of said 
city, and did then and there use, 
and cause to be used, said streets 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
TRADE AND TRAFFIC, AND 
FOR PRIVATE PURPOSES,-
without having first paid for and 
obtained a license so to do from 
the collector of the city of St. 
Louis, as required by the 
provisions of said ordinance." 
The emphasis has been 
added into the quote to point 
up the phraseology of the al-
legations, and is the basis for 
the title of this article. There 
are two entirely separate allega-
tions stated: (1) "for the pur-
pose of trade and traffic" states 
a business and commercial use; 
(2) "and for private purposes" 
states an intent to obtain 
livelihood, profit or gain. It is 
anticipated that many readers 
do not understand the 
tions and therefore \ 
agree with these tw 
elusions. What do the 
"trade" and "traffic" met 
how does "for private pu 
allege intent to obtain p 
TRADE 
TRADE (noun) l.Orip 
track; path, or a course, 
procedure. 2. A means o) 
one's living; occupation 
esp., skilled work, as distit 
from unskilled work, or 
profession or business; c 
Buying and selling; bartt 
merce. 4. All the persons. 
ticular line of business, 
tomers; clientele. 6. A pur 
sale; deal; bargain. 7. 
change; swap, (verb, intrt 
1. To carry on a trade or b 
2. To have business dealin 
someone). 3. To make 
change (with someone) 
loq.) To be a custome 
specified store or shop), 
transitive) To exchange 
barter. - SYN. see businei 
[Webster's NCT 
Dictionary (colfegiat< 
c 
TRADE "Any sort of c 
by way of sale or exchange 
merce; traffic." -- "Tlie dea 
a particular business: as, 
dian trade; the business o) 
ticular mechanic*" - "Bu 
broader sense it is general 
stmed as equivalent to a 
cupation, employment, 
icraft, or business." (cites o\ 
[Bouvicr's Law Dictl 
Third revision, 
TRADE "Tlte act orbusi 
exchanging commoditi 
barter; or the business of 
and selling for money; t 
barter." (cites omitted, pon 
definitions omitted) 
(Black's Law Dictionary 
ccJ 
"Trade'' is not a technica 
and is commonly used in 
senses: (I) in that of excht 
commodities by barter 
buying and selling for mom 
in that of an occupation gem 
(3) in that of a mecha 
employment, in contradistit 
to the learned professions, a$ 
u 
era I arts." 
pie v. Polar Vent of 
'4 N.V.S.2U 789> 10 
MIsc.2d 378 
y language the word 
oyed in three senses: 
of the business of 
lling; second, in that 
tion generally; and, 
t of a mechanical 
in contradistinction 
and the liberal arts. 
when we speak of 
nean commerce or 
that nature; when we 
rade" we men an oc-
the more general or 
mse.m 
MI Ins. Co. v. State, 24 
', 400, 86 Tex. 250, 22 
LRA. 483; 
•• Patterson, 55 F. 605, 
639; 
tons v. Karnofsky, 148 
So. 34, 177 La 229 
ord 'trade'is interpreted 
ehending not only all 
\e in buying and selling 
Use, but all whose oc-
x or business is to 
ure and sell the products 
ants. It includes in this 
employment or business 
f in for gain or profit" 
v. Dixon, 2 S.E.2d 521, 
215 N.C. 161 
ord 'trade'in its broadest 
ce includes, not only the 
r of exchanging com-
by barter, but the busi* 
buying and selling for 
r commerce and traffic 
Spring Water Ice Co. v. 
rlcan Ice Co., 64 A. 398, 
214 Pa. 640; 
May v. Sloan, 101 U.S. 231, 25 
LEd. 797; 
State v. Dixon, 1 S.E2d 521, 
215 N.C. 161; 
State v. Deckbacli, 149 N.E. 
194, 113 Ohio St. 347 
"An enterprise not conducted 
as a means of livelihood or for 
profit does not come within the 
ordinary meaning of the terms 
'business,' 'trade,' or 'industry.'" 
City of Coos Bay v. Aerie No. 
538, 170 P.2d 389, 399, 179 
Or. 83; 
City of Rochester v. Rochester 
Girls Home, 194 N.Y.S. 236; 
State v. Cooper, 285 N.W. 903, 
205 Minn. 333, 122 A.LR 727; 
Gardner v. Trustees of 
Church, 244 N.W. 667. 
"A 'trader' is one engaged in 
trade or in the business of buying 
and selling, and the term is 
synonymous with 'dealer.'" 
State v. Barnes, 35 S.E. 605, 
126 N.C. 1063; 
State v. Rosenbaum, 68 A. 250, 
80 Conn. 327; 
[Glibs from Words and Phrases] 
TRAFFIC 
TRAFFIC (noun) I Original-
ly, transportation of goods for 
trading; trading over great distan-
ces; commerce. 2. Buying and 
selling; barter; trade, [meanings 
omitted J 6. The business done by 
a transportation co. measured by 
the number of passengers, quantity 
of freight, etc. (verb, intransitive) 2. 
To have traffic, trade, or dealings 
(with someone). 
TRAFFICKER (noun) A per-
son who traffics; trader, dealer, 
merchant 
[Webster's, supra] 
TRAFFIC Commerce; trade; 
sale or exchange of merchandise, 
bills, money, and the like. Tlxe 
passing of goods or commodities 
from one person to another for an 
equivalent in goods or money; and 
a trafficker is one who traffics or a 
trader, a merchant [cite omitted] 
[Bouvicr's, supra] 
TRAFFIC (same as Bouvier's 
above, plus) The subjects of 
transportation on a route, as per-
sons and goods; the passing tb and 
from of persons, animals, 
vehicles, or vessels, along a route 
of transportation, as along a street, 
canal, etc. [cite omitted] 
[Black's, supra] 
"Traffic" is the buying of some-
thing from another or the selling of 
something to another" — "Traf-
ficking" imputes the carrying on or 
engaging in a business"— "Traffic" 
means the exchange of goods, 
wares, or merchandise between in-
dividuals, communities, or 
countries, whether directly by 
barter or by use of money, bills of 
exchange, etc; trade." — "Tlxe word 
'traffic' does not include 
pedestrians." 
[Consolidated glib from Words 
and Phrases] 
The defendants in St. Louis v. 
Green were two persons. 
Green had a partner in their 
little manufacturing enterprise 
which made apple cider and 
vinegar. So long as they con-
fined their activities within the 
grounds of their manufactory 
they were acting in the capacity, 
by testimony, as licensed to do 
that, as manufacturers. But, 
when they loaded their wagon 
and embarked upon the road 
they abandoned their status as 
manufacturers and took on a 
new capacity as street peddlers, 
or as traders or traffickers, as 
merchants, even though, as was 
testified, they were merely 
"delivering" their products to 
customers. They engaged upon 
an activity within the carrying 
trades, and effectively sup-
planted the "teamsters" and the 
local established merchants. 
Clearly they were "using the 
roads as a place of business" 
when they, effectively, peddled 
their cider door-to-door in their 
new and unlicensed business 
capacity as traders or traffick-
ers. Most likely they relied 
upon an earlier case (City of St. 
Louis v. Grone, 1870, 46 Mo. 
574) which held, in a case in-
volving almost identical facts, 
that the defendant there was 
not required to be licensed, but 
in 1870 the City had a different 
Charter and different powers in 
this area. The City enacted a 
new ordinance in 1878, ena-
bling new and larger powers. 
They tried, alas, no cigar (see 
also, City of St. Louis v. 
Woodruff, 4 Mo.App. 169 
(1877). 
In regard to the phrase "and 
for private purposes," at 17 
CJ.S. (Corpus Juris Secundum) 
6, titled "Constructive or Quasi-
contracts," you will find that 
such types rest upon the prin-
ciple of unjust enrichment. It is 
essential, says CJS, that the 
defendant has been enriched in 
some way (above and beyond 
that which he has right to) and 
that such "enrichment" was at 
the claimant's (plaintiff) ex-
pense; the "enrichment" and the 
efforts on the part of the defen-
dant "must have been com-
mitted with the intention of 
benefiting" the defendant's own 
estate. In other words the 
defendant obtained something: 
money or property or a labor 
amount done or to be done to 
the betterment of the 
defendant's own private and 
personal property. Hence, the 
allegation in the words, "and for 
private purposes" relates to un-
just enrichment at the cost of 
the City in the form of the repair 
of the streets in the city as used 
by the defendants Green and 
his partner when they sold their 
vinegar and cider upon the 
streets of the City as their place 
of business as traders and traf-
fickers, or merchants. 
Did you notice the change in 
capacity of the defendants in 
this case? Effectively, although 
not stated, so long as Green, et 
al were acting as manufacturers 
or producers they were not re-
quired to license their vehicle. 
But, the license requirement at-
tached upon the vehicle when 
it was used for purposes of trad-
ing or trafficking upon the 
streets, that is, when Green, et 
al personally, or through their 
employees engaged in an en-
tirely separate type of business 
activity(ies) of carrying and 
delivering their products (the 
carriage trade), or promoted 
and sold or traded and traffick-
ed upon the streets the 
products of their manufacture 
(as peddlers or merchants). It 
is essential that you understand 
the aspect of capacity if you are 
to understand the true nature of 
the vehicle and driver license 
issues. 
The appellate decision in St. 
Louis v. Green (discussed 
above) was ruled against the 
city upon the ground that a city 
could not levy a fine for a non-
payment of a tax. The City ap-
pealed to the Mo. Supreme 
Court. In City of St. Louis v. 
Green, 70 Mo. 562, at 564, the 
court said in regard the vehicle 
license portion of this appeal: 
"Tlte above objections are con-
sidered in the opinion of the St. 
Louis court of appeals, delivered 
by Judge Bakewell, and are fiilly 
answered, and we accept without 
recapitulation what is said therein 
in regard totiie validity of the or-
dinance so far as it requires a 
license tax to be paid by the owner 
of such a vehicle as defendants are 
charged with usingupon the streets 
of said city, as a correct exposition 
of the power of the city under its 
zharter to pass an ordinance re-
quiring the payment of a license 
ax." 
It is assumed that this state-
*nt will require some explana-
n, or "translation" so as to be 
uily understandable. The 
tatement refers to the power of 
tie city under its charter. A key \ 
>rovision of the charter was 
tated in the appellate decision 
t 7 Mo.App. 470, thusly: 
"Fifth. To license, tax, andregu-
ue...hackney carriages, private 
riages, barouches, buggies, 
agons, omnibuses, carts, drays, 
%d other vehicles, and all other 
isiness, trades, avocations, or 
vfessions whatever;." 
As can be seen, "wagons" is 
;ted in the provision, but the 
lpreme Court referred to a 
Lrticular kind of wagon in its 
itement when it said "...of 
ch a vehicle as defendants are 
arged with using..." At first 
tnce it would seem that the 
y had power to license, and 
tax, and to regulate any and 
private vehicles, but such is 
t the case, and the Supreme 
urt has rather directly so 
d. Of course most people 
1 not understand it. In order 
understand more correctly 
at the Supreme Court said it 
is necessary to consider the 
MAXIM, Noscitur a Sociis, 
which is defined as: 
"It is known from its associates. 
1 Vent. 225. Tlte meaning of a 
word is or may be known from the 
accompanying words. 3 Term. R. 
87; Broom, Max. 588. Morecock 
v. Hood, 202 N.C. 321, 162 S.E. 
730; Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. 
Fidelity & Deposit Co. of 
Maryland, 223 Ala. 385, 136 So. 
800. 
"The doctrine means that 
general and specific words are as-
sociated with and take color from 
each other, restricting general 
words to (a) sense analogous to 
(the) less general. Dunham v. 
State, 140Fla. 754, 192So. 324." 
[Black's 4th, supra] 
Within the charter provision 
(above, at "Fifth"), there are 
words of specific meaning 
mixed with words of a more 
general meaning; hackney car-
riages is an older term for a 
taxicab, omnibus is a form of 
horse-drawn bus, dray is a 
vehicle used for hauling heavy 
items and freight; private car-
riages, barouches, buggies, 
wagons and carts are all more 
general terms. When the maxim 
is applied to the charter 
provision it can be rewritten 
such that the more correct 
meaning is made clearer: 
FIFTH. To license, tax, and 
regulate...hackney carriages, 
private business carriages, busi-
ness barouches, business buggies, 
business wagons, omnibuses, 
business carts, drays, and other 
business vehicles, and all other 
business, trades, avocations, or 
professions whatever;... 
The Court has indicated 
that the power of the city did 
not extend to include the 
licensing of vehicles used for 
private and non-business 
purposes. 
Given this rewrite, the par-
ticular type of vehicle that the 
defendants in St. Louis v. Green 
were using upon the streets was 
a private business wagon which 
was used for the delivery and 
sales, or trade and traffic, of 
apple cider and vinegar. 
With this much "translated" 
and understood, the Mo. 
Supreme Court said that this 
was "...a correct exposition of 
the power of the city under its 
charter..." Impliedly, the Court 
has indicated that the power of 
the city did not extend to in-
clude the licensing of vehicles 
used for private and non-busi-
ness purposes. What is not said 
is often more eloquent than 
what is said. This conclusion 
was verified in a slightly dif-
ferentibrm in the case of City of 
Hannibal v. Price, 20 Mo.App. 
280 (1888), which ruled that a 
charter power to license, tax, 
and regulate...hacks, drays, 
wagons, and other vehicles 
used within the city for pay... did 
not authorize a power to im-
pose a license tax upon a 
vehicle used exclusively for 
private and non-business pur-
poses. In Hannibal v. Price, the 
appellant, Price, expressly con-
tended that "the legislature 
could not constitutionally 
authorize the city of Hannibal 
to assess and collect a license 
tax for a private buggy oh its 
streets for mere ordinary pur-
poses of travel thereon by the 
owner thereof, as such tax is 
inconsistent with the right of 
free use of the streets as public 
highways." The Court, in Han-
nibal, said in regard to the 
above contention: 
"This proposition was inciden-
tally discussed and decided adver-
sely to appellant in City of St. 
Louis v. Greene, 7 MoApp. 474. 
In that case a provision in the 
charter of the city of St. Louis, 
authorizing it "to license, tax, and 
regulate hackney carriages, private 
carriages, barouches, buggies, 
wagons, omnibuses, carts, drays, 
and other vehicles,n was upheld as 
constitutionally valid in regard to 
all the subjects of license therein 
enumerated." 
A cursory reading of this last 
quote might lead one to think 
that the court was saying that 
the constitutional quest 
Hannibal was already c 
Error! The appellant 
Louis v. Green (the a] 
court decision as cite 
GREEN! The Hanniba 
was NOT saying that tl 
stitutional questioi 
decided adversely to 
Actually, the Hannibal cc 
not address the constit 
question as raised by Pri< 
court mentioned the issu 
discussed it in a difFerei 
text, then went on to dec 
Hannibal v. Price appeal 
on the ground of the < 
power of the city. In 
words the Hannibal 
evaded the constitutiona 
tion. Even despite the ei 
the Hannibal decision, b 
ing that St. Louis v. Gree 
valid, "in regard to all th 
jects of license th 
enumerated" verifies and 
ports the theme of this a 
namely, that vehicles usee 
those occupations, su< 
driver, which use and mak 
place of business the p 
highways for purposes of 
and traffic are the ONLY i 
sable activities and occupa 
as relates to the use o 
roads, even though the c 
might evade the constitut 
issue. It can truly be said 
one has a right to drive (noi 
cupationally) as a motorist, 
perhaps not as a right as a d 
(an occupation). 
L 
USE OF and CAPACITIES 
of the HIGHWAYS, 
ROADS, & STREETS 
By Clair Foster 
Terms 
Capacities of use, in the sense of 
juristic entities as separate 
from a natural person or 
natural citizen. 
Highways, in the sense of inter-
state highways, and state high-
ways, and as if separate from 
any other easement of way. A 
railroad right-of-way is a state 
highway specifically dedi-
cated to railroad purposes. 
Roads, in the sense of county 
roads, and as if separate from 
all other easements of way. 
I Roads include alleys, etc., in 
county. 
Streets, in the sense of city 
streets, and as if separate from 
all other easements of way. 
Streets include alleys, etc. 
Commercial Uses 
The following represent the 
various types of commercial 
uses of the public's easements 
and all such forms ofuse are in 
a juristic person capacity; the 
name of the type of the use is 
the capacity. All of these 
capacities represent a use of the 
easements as a place of busi-
ness, or as a necessary incident 
of a business which otherwise is 
conducted off the easements. 
All derive a benefit to their 
private estate or business at the 
expense of the public by the fact 
of the use of the easements, and 
|. the lack of or reduced expense 
to the business because of the 
tax funds which create and 
maintain the easements in a 
j usable and passable condition. 
A private motorist or a traveler 
is not a juristic entity - that's 
why such form of use is not 
listed above. 
A) INTERSTATE HIGH-
WAYS (Motor Freeways) 
1) Interstate common car-
riers of freight 
2) Interstate contract car-
riers, private freight carriers 
3) Interstate common car-
riers of passengers 
4) Interstate contract car-
riers, private passenger carriers 
5) Combinations of above 
B) STATE HIGHWAYS (Intra-
state only) 
1) Intra-state common car-
riers of freight 
2) Intra-state contract car-
riers, private freight carriers 
3) Intra-state common car-
riers of passengers 
4) Intra-state contract car-
riers, private passenger carriers 
5) Combinations of above 
C) COUNTY ROAD AND 
CITY STREETS (Inter-
Urban & Local only) 
1) All of 1 thru 5 each as 
above, plus 
2) Common carriers of 
freight 
3) Common carriers of pas-
sengers (buses, etc) 
4) Private contract carriers, 
including store deliveries 
5) Private carriers of pas-
sengers (tour buses, etc) 
6) Combinations of above 
7) County & City taxicabs 
(common carrier of passengers) 
8) Inter- urban & local "Jit-
ney" cabs or motor buses 
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IN THE UNITED STATES 
Br 
Hallstrom 
w year unfolds, it 
It another year in 
te prophets of Baal 
their wicked in-
thls nation. This 
he year of "Get the 
te American Bar As-
ains its vipers to 
e heart of God's 
May 4th and 5th, 
Francisco, CA, the 
ur Association held 
nd advertised that 
was for: "Attorneys 
) be on the leading 
explosive new area 
tiling pastors, chur-
leir congregations). 
g this seminar, The 
Report" made the 
ation that: 
\BA is no ally of 
\rf but a sinister foe. 
little or nothing in 
r to discourage suits 
d's people." 
>m the attorney's 
should there be? To 
hurches are simply 
lent to represent or 
> litigate against if he 
e up some issues to 
rhese attorneys are 
snakes and will go to 
le to win their case, 
pie, Chalcedon also 
sit one of the instruc-
seminar said that "the 
lia should write ar-
the community on 
Ipractice prior to the 
' to trial.* Of course, 
attempt to bias future 
of the jury and to set 
ty standards of review 
ti related litigation, 
is no entity more un-
to write articles on 
lalpractice than the 
dia unless it would be 
Neither would know 
stand the word of God 
ere staring them in the 
t the importance of the 
tion is that it blatantly 
that attorneys as a 
are anti-church and 
• a«H.Christ. Thev are 
no better than the money 
changers Christ threw out of the 
Temple of God. They are silver 
tongucd prophets of BaaL They 
are teachers of Apostasy against 
the Living God of Abraham, 
Isaac, and Jacob. 
LAWYERS AND THE 
CHURCH 
In 1976 there were only 45 
court cases involving churches. 
This increased to 2,100 cases by 
1980; 4,000 cases by 1982; 
8,000 cases by 1985; and that 
number has probably doubled 
again in the last four years. That 
amounts to over a 17,000 per-
cent increase in nine years from 
1976 to 1985. 
A church in Medford, 
Oregon, had a problem with its 
school buses, which it parked 
on a vacant lot adjacent to the 
church. The final result, after 
lengthy litigation, was th£ 
church was ordered to park 
their busses elsewhere, and 
they were stuck with attorney's 
fees that exceeded $51,000. 
The church spent $51,000 to 
loose, and they haven't even 
started the appeals process 
which will cost even more 
money, and it is doubtful that 
they will win. Who profited 
from this litigation? - ATTOR-
NEYS! 
Courtroom litigation is big 
business. A little math reveals 
just how big. If it cost $50,000 
for a simple bus parking case, 
what would it cost for cases in-
volving bigger issues? But let's 
just look at 8,000 in litigation in 
1985. Let's see, 8,000 cases at 
$50,000 per case equals 
$400,000,000. WOW! 400 mil-
lion dollars is big bucks by 
anybody's standards, and it all 
went into the pockets of attor-
neys. And don't forget, it will 
keep the courts busy; therefore 
we will need more judges, court 
clerks, marshals, etc. Look how 
the economy benefits, and all 
because the attorneys and 
government have stumbled 
upon another source of 
revenue - the churches. 
Now here is a new way to 
destroy the churches - make it 
financially untenable for them 
to exist. A little tax here, a little 
tax there, a zoning law or two, 
coupled with expensive court 
litigation ought to do the trick. 
Suing churches has become 
exploited to the degree that the 
American Bar Association (ABA) 
now trains lawyers how to sue 
pastors and churches. 
It almost defies logic that an 
attorney can call himself a Chris-
tian. However, like the 
Pharisaical lawyers of the days 
of Christ, it is the profession of 
lawyers to know the law 
(precepts of men) and force it 
upon die rest of society. They 
are "spiritual hypocrites" in that 
they claim to know Christ, yet 
they practice Apostasy (ways of 
the heathen) by learning the law 
of the Babylonian beast and live 
on fruits gained therefrom. 
APOSTASY 
FORBIDDEN 
All forms of apostasy were 
forbidden by the 1st and 2nd 
commandments, and any turn-
ing away from the Lord would 
be apostasy. Moses, in speak-
ing to the people of Israel, was 
scolding them for their past ini-
quities and stated: 
"...ye rebelled against the 
commandment of the LORD 
your God, and ye believed him 
not, nor hearkened to bis voice. 
"Ye have been rebellious 
against the LORD from the day 
that I knew you." Deut 9:23-24 
Here we have an example of 
apostasy or rebellion against 
the Lord, and in this case we see 
that the specific act of rebellion 
was that of rebelling "against the 
commandment of the LORD 
your God." Therefore rebellion 
or sedition against the Lord is 
being disobedient against the 
word of the Lord and is a form 
of apostasy. 
Teachers of 
Apostasy 
Scripture records that there 
were certain people who were 
teachers of apostasy. Jeremiah 
states that these false teachers 
taught rebellion: 
"Therefore thus saitb the 
LORD; Behold, I will punish 
Sbemaiab the Nebelamite, and 
bis seed: be shall not have a 
man to dwell among this 
people; neither shall he behold 
the good that I will do for my 
people, saitb the LORD; be-
cause be bath taught rebellion 
against the LORD." fer 29:32 
The history of Israel abounds 
with false prophets, and the 
false prophets are with us^mto 
this day. False prophets 
seemed to be even more plenti-
ful in the courts of the kings of 
Israel. As recorded in I Kings 
18:19-20, Ahab had 800 false 
prophets who openly advo-
cated the worship of Baal and 
Asherah. 
Jeremiah discussed those 
false prophets who claimed to 
receive visions from God and 
counseled rebellion against 
Babylon: 
"Therefore hearken not ye to 
your prophets, nor to your 
diviners, nor to your dreamers, 
nor to your enchanters, nor to 
your sorcerers, which speak 
unto you, saying, Ye shall not 
serve the king of Babylon." Jer 
27:9 
These false prophets taught 
rebellion from the ways of God 
(Jer 28:15-16; 29:32). Israel 
should have paid more atten-
tion to the laws recorded at 
Deut 13:1-5, which was ex-
pounded upon by Moses and 
called for the death penalty to 
anyone who even so much as 
advocated the worship of 
another god. 
Rebellion, sedition, wicked-
ness, etc., are all forms of apos-
tasy, and in the Old Testament 
were normally applied to those 
who rebelled against the word 
of the Lord. We need to keep in 
. mind that the rebellion was 
against the religious, political, 
and economic laws of the Lord, 
as the kingdom of God (Israel) 
was noi divided into three or 
more functions of government, 
being basically a theocracy with 
God as the executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial branches of 
government. Therefore, apos-
tasy would consist of any viola-
tion of the word of God, not just 
a violation of the religious com-
mandments. 
Judaism As 
Apostasy 
The way of Christ was a sharp 
departure from the religion 
called Judaism. Judaism was a 
relatively new religion which, 
for the nation of Israel, became 
the predominant religion at the 
time of the Babylonian exile. 
With the creation of the Talmud 
and the Midrashim Judaism 
evolved into one of unscriptural 
traditions or what is called th£ 
'traditions of the elders" or the 
"precepts of men." These terms 
are used in Matthew 15 where 
Christ denies their traditions or 
precepts and stated the 
Pharisees, scribes and lawyers 
were transgressing nthe com-
nandment of God because of 
vourtradition" (Matt 15:3) and 
hey were apostatizing by 
teaching for doctrines the 
commandments of men (Matt 
5:9)." 
Notice that it says "your tradi-
lonH or the tradition of the 
harisees - not the tradition of 
rod. These traditions were ex-
stnded until it was impossible 
>r the average person to know 
hat was expected of them in 
leir daily life, and therefore the 
eed for lawyers. 
Zondervon's Pictorial En-
xlopedia states of lawyers: 
"Since every detail of Jewish 
e was expected to be regit-
ted by the law, and since it 
%s impossible for an ordU 
ry Jew to become familiar 
tb the multitude of legal re-
irements and apply them in 
t new situations of daily life, 
vas absolutely necessary for 
ne men to devote themselves 
a study of the law. Those 
>o did were the lawyers." 
ndervon's Pictorial En-
lopedia of the Bible, Volume 
X897 
Lawyers as 
Apostates 
A review of the Gospels 
reveals that Christ was always 
being challenged by the 
religious leaders -- the 
Pharisees, Sadducees, and the 
Herodians. Christ specifically 
warned the disciples to beware 
of the leaven, or the guidance 
from the Pharisees, the Sad-
ducees, and the Herodians. 
Among His accusers where 
those whom Scripture calls 
lawyers. 
It was the lawyers who 
rejected the teaching of John 
the Baptist: 
"But the Pharisees and 
lawyers refected the counsel of 
God against themselves, being 
not baptized of him." Luke 7:30 
It was the lawyers who 
hindered those who sought 
truth: 
"Then answered one of the 
lawyers, and said unto him, 
Master, thus saying thou 
reproacbest us also. 
"And be said, Woe unto you 
also, ye lawyers/ for ye lade 
men with burdens grievous to 
be borne, and ye yourselves 
touch not the burdens with one 
of your fingers. 
"Woe unto you, lawyers//or 
ye have taken away the key of 
knowledge: ye entered not in 
yourselves, and them that were 
entering in ye hindered." Luke 
11:45-46,52 
It was the lawyers who 
criticized Christ for healing on 
the Sabbath: 
"And Jesus answering spake 
unto the lawyers and 
Pharisees, saying, Is it lawful 
to heal on the sabbath day?" 
Luke 14:3 
It was the lawyers who kept 
asking Christ difficult questions: 
"Then one of them, which 
was a lawyer, asked him a 
question, tempting him, and 
saying..." Matthew 22.35 
NT False Prophets 
of Israel 
There was also no lack of 
false prophets in the days of 
Christ and the aposdes. Christ 
gave a warning early on in His 
ministry to: 
"Beware of false prophets, 
which come to you in sheep's 
clothing, but inwardly they are 
ravening wolves." Matthew 
7.15 
Christ, in addressing the 
signs of the end of the age, 
warns: 
"For there shall arise false 
Cbrists, and false prophets, 
and shall shew great signs and 
wonders; insomuch that, if it 
were possible, they shall 
deceive the very elect." Matt 
24:24 
Lawyers as 
Apostates 
At the time of Christ, His ad-
versaries were men having 
many letters; men who were ex-
perts in the laws of man. These 
men were the false prophets, 
the teachers of APOSTASY of 
those days, and they were the 
Pharisees, scribes, Sadducees, 
and the LAWYERS. Christ said 
of these people: 
"...Woe unto you also, ye 
lawyers/ for ye lade men with 
burdens grievous to be 
borne,..." 
"Woe unto you, lawyers//or 
ye have taken away the key of 
knowledge: ye entered not in 
yourselves, and them that were 
entering in ye hindered. 
"And as be said these things 
unto them, the scribes and the 
Pharisees began to urge him 
vehemently, and to provoke 
him to speak of many things: 
"Laying wait for him, and 
seeking to catch something out 
of bis mouth, that they might 
accuse him." Luke 11:49J2-54 
It was the lawyers who 
demanded that the people ob-
serve the "traditions of the 
elders11 or the "precepts ofmenH 
and it appears that they them-
selves paid little or no attention 
to them - at least in secret 
It was the lawyers who, by 
the "traditions of the elders," 
had taken away the true mean-
ing and method of interpreting 
prophecies. It was the lawyers 
who denied that Christ 
son of God and therefc 
the wrong interpretatio 
prophecies on the kingc 
the Messiah. 
It was the lawyers, als 
scribes, "who urged "Hii 
mently," that is cont 
questioned Him in an t 
entrap Him with word 
cause Him to "speak o 
things," or more approj 
"speak rashly." Their s 
manners, and question 
not those of believers, bu 
of accusers or advei 
(devils). 
It was the lawyers wh 
sessed the keys of kno^  
and were supposed to 
teachers of the law, ye 
were engrossed in the 
tions of the elders" c 
"precepts of men" - n< 
Word of God. It was the la 
who occupied the respo 
positions, yet failed to in 
the people in the truth of 
Word. It was the lawyer 
refused to accept the kin 
of God and hindere 
prevented the people 
entering in as much as 
could. 
APOSTASY IN Tl 
UNITED STATE 
Again it needs to be s 
that the false prophets 
linked to the beast systen 
the world. 
The beasts of Daniel an< 
beasts of Revelation are all 
erences to governme 
Governments and the pe 
are controlled directly by 
laws of that government, an 
course indirectly by the pe< 
who make the laws of 
government. In this reg 
more power is exercised 
those who make laws than 
those who enforce laws. ' 
leads to the questions: V 
makes the laws? Who enfoi 
the laws? Are laws scripti 
and are they scripturally 
forced? 
Lawyers as Maker 
of the Law 
For Israelites and those * 
z only giver of Law. 
w is "precepts of 
urly history of this 
aw of the land was 
God - not the 
men." It has only 
ime that man took 
• of making law until 
iw of God is con-
d or of no conse-
the law or "precepts 
low considered the 
v of the land. This 
more lawyers per 
any nation in the 
m look up the com-
he federal and state 
you will find that 
tage of legislators 
wyers is quite high. 
>st part, those who 
/yers depend upon 
ire lawyers to inter-
xplain laws under 
an. In addition, in 
all proposed legisla-
t ed by a full-time 
t employee who is 
r. Since all legisla-
ared by an attorney, 
bly the most power-
and one of the most 
arsons in every state, 
siness of lawyers to 
w (precepts of men) 
re obviously heavily 
making the law. 
wyers as 
•cers of the 
Law 
Tally accepted that it 
y of the executive 
t of government to 
^ law. Most people 
the FBI, the State 
Sheriffs office, and 
lice to be the enfor-
law. While it is true 
es are charged with 
the law, in reality 
srs write traffic cita-
rug and other inves-
make arrests, and 
gaily incarcerate 
t they have no power 
te those whom they 
esponsibility for 
i falls to the Justice 
nt, the Attorney 
id District or County 
prosecutors have the power to 
prosecute or not prosecute as 
they deem appropriate. In 
other words, the police may ar-
rest anyone they want but if the 
prosecutor does not want to 
prosecute the case, he has the 
power to get the case dismissed. 
Therefore, it can be concluded 
that the real enforcer of the law 
is an- attorney, for few if any 
states allow anyone other than 
an attorney to become 
prosecutors - judges maybe, 
but prosecutors NO! 
Lawyers as Judges 
of the Law 
Lawyers, when appearing in 
a court of law, are members of 
the Judiciary branch called of-
ficers of the court, and as such 
owe their allegiance to the 
judiciary (i.e the court) first, 
and only secondly to the client 
who pays their fees. 
Anybody who has dealt with 
the Judiciary understands that 
almost every judge is a lawyer. 
Every lawyer judge is a member 
of the exclusive legal monopoly 
called the Bar Association and 
owe their allegiance to other 
members of the bar. 
Thus we see that for the most 
part lawyers write the law, 
lawyers, enforce the law, and 
lawyers determine the law. 
One would think that this situa-
tion would violate the separa-
tion of powers doctrine in most 
state constitutions. 
ARE LAWYER'S 
LAWS SCRIPTURAL? 
Many laws are scriptural as 
all states have a law similar to 
"thou shalt not kill." There are 
only approximately 760 laws 
listed in the Bible whereas it 
takes shelf after shelf in very 
large buildings to hold the vast 
volumes of laws which have 
been created by man, and the 
majority of those laws are not 
scriptural < No one has a prob-
lem with criminal laws against 
murder, robbery, rape, kidnap-
ping, and any other offense 
wherein a damage was com-
mitted to another person. 
However, there is a vast dif-
person for not performing a 
specific act. 
Any time specific perfor-
mance or social duties are re-
quired by law, the law is regulat-
ing the manners or conduct of 
men as social beings in relation 
to each other, and with refer-
ence to right or wrong. Deter-
mining what conduct is right or 
wrong is determining what con-
duct is good or evil, virtuous or 
vicious, and such a determina-
tion always has reference to the 
law of a god by which the stand-
ard of their character can be 
determined. Any good diction-
ary will reveal that MmoralH law 
is a law of a god which 
prescribes moral or social 
duties. 
Therefore it can be con-
cluded that all "specific perfor-
mance" laws or "social duties" 
passed by legislators are a com-
posite of several differing moral 
values, and God's values are sel-
dom if ever taken into con-
sideration. Remember now 
that when a law requires certain 
conduct it is setting a standard 
by which the character of in-
dividuals will be judged, and 
therefore the collective vote of 
the legislature is acting in the 
capacity of a god determining 
"social duties," right and wrong, 
or good and ievil. These laws of 
man are what Christ called the 
"traditions of the elders" and 
"precepts of man." 
James recorded that we 
should: 
"...be ye doers of the word, 
and not bearers only, deceiv-
ing your own selves. 
"For if any be a bearer of the 
word, and not a doer, be is like 
unto a man beholding bis 
natural face in a glass: 
"For be beboldeth himself 
and goetb bis way, and 
straightway forgetteth what 
manner of man be was. 
"But whoso looketb into the 
perfect law of liberty, and con-
tinuetb therein, be being not a 
forgetful bearer, but a doer of 
the work, this man shall be 
blessed in bis deed" James 
1:22-25 
Paul also instructed us that: 
"Know ye not, that to whom 
ve vield yourselves servants to 
— ^ -^, „ 
unto death, or of obedience 
unto righteousness?" Romans 
6.16 
As Israelites or Christians our 
moral character or "social 
duties" are determined by God, 
who is the one and only law 
giver, and we are ONLY known 
as HIS servants when we obey 
HIM - not the "traditions of the 
elders" or the "precepts of man." 
CONCLUSION 
The attorneys of this country 
are the 20th century Canaanites 
who: 
"...feared the LORD, and 
served their own gods,..." II 
Kings 17:33 
These Canaanites "served 
their own gods," that is they 
obeyed the "traditions of the 
elders" and the "precepts of 
men," therefore even though 
they feared God -- they served 
HIM not! The same is true of 
lawyers. They "serve(d) their 
own gods," that is they obey the 
ntraditions of the eldersn and 
the "precepts of men," which are 
the laws of the nation and the 
state - not the laws of God. 
Therefore even though they 
fear God - they serve HIM not! 
They are servants of BAAL! 
Christ admonished them as fol-
lows: 
"Ye serpents, ye generation 
of vipers,..." Matthew 2333a 
Christ was speaking to the 
lawyers of His day and he called 
them serpents and vipers, but 
they were murderers from the 
beginning and their traditions 
are maintained today by vipers 
we call attorneys and lawyers. 
Now that these vipers and 
serpents have attacked the 
church, their APOSTASY or cup 
of iniquity runneth over and it 
is easy to understand why Christ 
did not quit by simply calling 
them snakes but he also stated: 
"...how can ye escape the 
damnation of bell?" Matthew 
2333b 
